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The contemporary analysis of human existence fills us all with a sense of
fragility, with the power of dark instincts, with the suffering caused by
mysteries and illusions, and with the finitude shown by all that is living, even
where the highest creations of communal life arise from it.—Wilhelm Dilthey
Browsing in a used bookstore in Berkeley, California around the time my close
collaborator, George Atwood, and I had begun working on an ambitious project
tentatively entitled ‘‘The Tragic and the Metaphysical,’’ I happened upon de Mul’s
(2004) book, The Tragedy of Finitude: Dilthey’s Hermeneutics of Life—a chance
encounter that proved to be highly relevant to our nascent project. This chance
encounter and its relevance provide an example of what is perhaps the central theme
in de Mul’s interpretation of Dilthey’s philosophy—the radical finitude and factical
contingency of human life and of the philosophies that seek to comprehend it.
In The Tragedy of Finitude, de Mul seeks to reconstruct Wilhelm Dilthey’s life
project, his uncompleted Critique of Historical Reason, from texts appearing in his
Collective Writings, published more than six decades after his death in 1911. In the
process, de Mul both explicates centrally important though little-known aspects of
Dilthey’s hermeneutics of human life and shows how these aspects presage later
ideas in hermeneutic phenomenology, including especially those developed by
Heidegger, Gadamer, and Derrida. De Mul, in my view, succeeds admirably in his
aim, and his book is a magnificent, invaluable piece of philosophical and historical
scholarship.
De Mul takes Kant’s (1998/1781 and 1787) Critique of Pure Reason as the
starting point for his elucidation of Dithey’s philosophy. Indeed, de Mul’s central
thesis is that Dilthey’s Critique of Historical Reason can be understood as a
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radicalization of Kant’s recognition of the contingency and finitude of human
reason. Kant claims that human knowledge of the world is contingent on the a priori
forms of perception and categories of cognition, but he also holds that these a priori
structures are timeless. Dilthey’s Critique of Historical Reason, by contrast, would
emphasize that even these a priori structures are historically contingent, a claim
holding monumental implications for hermeneutic philosophy. In this essay, I will
focus on de Mul’s account of Dilthey’s transcendental-historical life philosophy (as
de Mul 2004, p. 158, aptly calls it) and omit any consideration of Dilthey’s
descriptive psychology, which to me is less important philosophically.
De Mul captures succinctly Dilthey’s radicalization of Kant’s transcendental
philosophy: ‘‘Against Kant’s timeless a priori he sets a historical a priori, and
against Kant’s intellectualistic approach he sets an approach that is based on the
totality of life’’ (de Mul 2004, pp. 140–141), i.e., the whole human being. Thus,
instead of the transcendental apperception of Kant, the intellectual ‘‘I think’’ that
accompanies every representation, Dilthey argues for a coherent ‘‘I think, I want, I
feel’’ being constitutive of every human experience. In replacing Kantian formal
categories with ‘‘real categories’’ or ‘‘life categories,’’ Dilthey, like Nietzsche,
Kierkegaard, and Heidegger, places himself in opposition to the cognitivist
philosophical tradition that seeks to separate thought from life—a tradition that my
collaborators and I (Atwood et al. 2011) have characterized as a Cartesian madness.
Anticipating Heidegger’s (1962/1927) formulation of Being-in-the-world, Dilthey
also contends that primordial lived experience entails an experience of self and
world in which the bifurcation of subject and object does not yet appear. The
subject-object distinction, according to Dilthey, is a theoretical fiction.
The historicity of the a priori, according to de Mul, is already contained in
Dilthey’s transformation of the Kantian formal categories of reason into the real
categories of life, because their historicity is inherent to the nature of the life
categories. Dilthey unrelentingly adheres to the Kantian presupposition of a
constitutive transcendental structure that precedes and is the condition of the
possibility of the phenomenal world, while at the same time claiming that these
a priori structures of intelligibility develop over the course of a living historical
process. Foreshadowing Heidegger’s (1982/1961) ‘‘history of Being,’’ Dilthey went
so far as to claim that each historical age exhibits its own distinctive transcendental
structure. Dilthey, in de Mul’s account, proposes no less than a historization of the
ontological structure of life, and investigation of the historical development of these
structures of intelligibility becomes for Dilthey a task for genetic inquiry.
In assessing Dilthey’s ‘‘advancement on Kant,’’ de Mul makes a valuable
distinction between a transcendental presupposition and particular transcendental
structures. Dilthey’s principal transcendental presupposition is that of a constitutive
transcendental structure for experience that is continuously in development. The
specific forms of this transcendental experiential structure—the specific structures
of intelligibility that disclose reality in a particular way—are, according to Dilthey,
fashioned over the course of history. De Mul notes that even the most fundamental
transcendental presupposition is itself subject to historical development. Thus there
is a tragic dimension to historical consciousness, in that it brings out the ‘‘tragic
contradiction between the philosophical desire for universal validity [the
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metaphysical impulse] and the realization of the fundamental finitude of every
attempt to satisfy that desire’’ (de Mul 2004, p. 154). Dilthey’s recognition of this
tragic contradiction leads him, according to de Mul’s account, to elaborate a
hermeneutic phenomenology of metaphysics.
Dilthey’s historical reconstruction of the development of metaphysics aims at no
less than its ‘‘euthanasia’’. Although he holds that metaphysical desire is inherent to
human nature, what he seeks to unmask are the illusions that this ubiquitous desire
creates. Metaphysical illusion, according to Dilthey, transforms historically
contingent nexuses of intelligibility—worldviews, as he eventually calls them—
into timeless forms of reality. Again anticipating Heidegger, Dilthey holds that
every worldview is grounded in a mood regarding the tragic realization of the
finitude of life. The metaphysicalization of worldviews transforms the unbearable
fragility and transience of all things human into an enduring, permanent, changeless
reality, an illusory world of eternal truths.
De Mul gives a compelling narrative describing the development of hermeneutics
from Dilthey to Heidegger to Gadamer to Derrida as consisting in successive
radicalizations of the realization of the finitude of human understanding. Here I wish
only to elaborate on de Mul’s view of Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology as
an original appropriation and radicalization of Dilthey’s hermeneutic life
philosophy.
We have already seen how aspects of Dilthey’s transcendental-historical life
philosophy foreshadow important themes in Heidegger’s (1962/1927) existential
analytic. The constitutive transcendental structures of experience emphasized by
both Kant and Dilthey show up in Heidegger’s conception of the ‘‘ontological
difference’’ and the Being of beings—the intelligibility of entities as the entities
they are for us. As Being-in-the-world, we are always already intelligible to
ourselves as embedded in a context of human significance and meaningfulness. Like
Dilthey’s conception of life, our factical existence for Heidegger is historical
through and through, and our ‘‘thrownness’’ into our historical situatedness is
disclosed in our moods. Like Dilthey, Heidegger emphasizes our thrownness into
temporal finitude, our ‘‘Being-toward-death’’. And in a manner reminiscent of
Dilthey’s unmasking of the ubiquity of metaphysical desire and illusion, Heidegger
unveils the manifold ways in which we evade the Angst of authentic Being-toward-
death by fleeing into the illusions of conventional everyday interpretedness and the
‘‘idle talk’’ of das Man.
Dilthey’s anticipation of some central themes in the later Heidgger is even more
striking to me. Paralleling Dilthey’s earlier emphasis on the historicity of the
a priori, the later Heidegger puts forth a ‘‘history of Being’’ (Heidegger 1982/1961),
which is essentially a genealogical deconstruction of Western metaphysics:
[M]etaphysics determines the history of the Western era. Western humankind,
in all its relations with beings, and even to itself, is in every respect sustained
and guided by metaphysics. (p. 205).
Metaphysics grounds an age, in that through a specific interpretation of what is
and through a specific comprehension of truth it gives to that age the basis
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upon which it is essentially formed. This basis holds complete dominion over
all the phenomena that distinguish the age. (Heidegger 1977/1938: 115).
As is masterfully outlined by Thomson (2005), Heidegger seeks to illuminate the
great metaphysical systems of Western philosophy as objectifications of epochs in
the historical unfolding of Being (Sein), of the intelligibility of entities as the
entities they are for us. In this vision, the foundationalist systems offered by Plato,
Aristotle, Augustine, and Descartes reify the way entities showed up in their
particular historical epochs of intelligibility, as manifestations, respectively, of the
eternal immaterial ideas, of primary and secondary substance, of the thoughts of
God, and of the subject-object bifurcation. In Heidegger’s (1984/1954) interpre-
tation, Nietzsche was the last Western metaphysician, whose doctrine of the eternal
return of the same captures the way entities as a whole are intelligible in our
technological era as meaningless resources to be calculated, stored, and optimized in
the quest to conquer the earth. The metaphysical impulse is grasped by the later
Heidegger as a relentless tendency to transform the experience of the real—how
entities are intelligible to us—into a reified vision of the REALLY real. He pictures
himself as the initiator of a post-metaphysical ‘‘second beginning’’ in the history of
Being, in which hypostatized metaphysical entities would be expunged, and he
formulates Being as such (Seyn) as an inexhaustible and unknowable source of all
intelligibility (Thomson 2011) reminiscent of Dilthey’s characterizations of the
unfathomability of life. But in his postulation of an inexhaustible source, do we not
see Heidegger himself succumbing to a seemingly irresistible desire for metaphys-
ical illusion in the face of radical finitude, the inevitable succumbing that Dilthey
contends is inherent to human nature?
Returning to de Mul’s book, the concluding chapter is devoted to ‘‘the topicality
of Dilthey’s hermeneutics,’’ conceived in terms of three interrelated themes that
pervade the entire text. The first de Mul calls ambivalence—the eternal tension
between the affirmation of human finitude and the longing to overcome it through
metaphysical illusion. The second is contingency—the historicity of all human
experience and understanding that necessitates an attitude of ontological pluralism
and epistemic humility. And third and overarchingly is finitude—the spatial and
temporal limitedness of human life itself, along with the unbearable feelings of
insignificance and groundlessness that accompany an owning-up to this limitedness.
In my view, these Diltheyan themes, especially that of radical finitude and
groundlessness, are particularly topical in our current historical era. I (Stolorow
2009) characterize our era as an Age of Trauma because the tranquilizing illusions
of our everyday world seem in our time to be severely threatened from all sides—by
global diminution of natural resources, by global warming, by global nuclear
proliferation, by global terrorism, and by global economic collapse. These are forms
of collective trauma in that they threaten to obliterate the basic framework with
which we as members of our particular society have made sense out of our
existence. As Lear (2006) puts it:
We live at a time of a heightened sense that civilizations are themselves
vulnerable. Events around the world … have left us with an uncanny sense of
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menace. We seem to be aware of a shared vulnerability that we cannot quite
name…. It is [an existential] vulnerability that we all share in virtue of being
human (Lear 2006: 7–8).
In an era of heightened existential vulnerability and awareness of finitude there is
a correspondingly heightened need for new contexts of human understanding. Here
we owe an enormous debt of gratitude to de Mul for providing us with a superb
explication of the thought of Wilhelm Dilthey, whose precocious insights into the
finitude and historical contingency of human understanding promise to contribute
immeasurably to the widening of its horizons.
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